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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A FRESH
LOOK AT THE EXEMPTION PROCESS AND THE
EVOLUTION OF ARMY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
JASON C. WELLS*
INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act of 19731 ("ESA") was enacted with
many noble goals in mind. Most basically, it may be viewed as the finished
product of years of efforts by environmentalists and politicians to create
meaningful, substantive protection for endangered species.2 The effort was
successful, perhaps more so than its supporters anticipated.
By 1978, Congress had recognized the need for limitations to the
ESA and created several exemptions that limited the sweeping substan-
tive protection afforded by the original Act.3 Among these exemptions,
and perhaps the most broad, is the Secretary of Defense's ("SECDEF" or
'Secretary") exemption for the purpose of national security.4 With no
apparent limitation on the Secretary of Defense's authority, this
exemption has, from the start, been controversial. The fact that this
exemption has never been used has led commentators to speculate
broadly on what the Secretary's authority is, how it should be applied,
and how it affects the overall implementation of the ESA itself.5
Environmentalists and mainstream legal scholars in particular
have viewed the absolute nature of the Secretary's exemption as a reason
" Jason C. Wells is a Captain in the United States Army and a 2007 J.D. candidate at
William & Mary Law School. He would like to thank Colonel Charles L. Green for his
invaluable assistance throughout the writing process, as well as Robert M. Lewis of the
Army Environmental Law Division, Professor Charles H. Koch, Jr., and Professor Erin
Ryan. The views presented in this Note are the author's alone and do not represent those
of the Department of Defense or the United States Army.
1 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006)).
2See infra Part I.A.
3Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process under the Endangered Species Act: How
the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 825, 840-49 (1991).
4 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2006).
5 See infra Part III.B.
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to avoid further substantive military exceptions to the ESA.6 Other com-
mentators have asserted that the exception should be used to resolve
some compliance issues, while arguing that the military may even need
further substantive exemptions to environmental policies in general,
including the ESA.' The Army appears to have avoided the debate by
focusing its environmental efforts on ESA compliance instead of ex-
emption requests.8
The debate over the national security exemption has continued,
reinvigorated by the proposal and passage of new military exemptions
to the ESA in 2004 as part of the Range Readiness and Preservation
Initiative ("RRPI").9 Although comparatively limited, the RRPI served as
a lighting rod for competing viewpoints on military ESA compliance.' °
Arguments against further deference to the military's training or oper-
ational needs resurfaced with new vigor, while proponents of the new
exemptions saw the ever-increasing friction between scarce environmental
resources and training requirements as necessitating new procedural
safeguards to maintain military readiness."
This Note begins with a historical overview of the ESA and its
subsequent amendments, addressing the use of the exemption process
after 1978 while focusing specifically on the U.S. Army.' 2
'See infra Part III.B.
v See E.G. Willard, Tom Zimmerman & Eric Bee, Environmental Law and National
Security: Can Existing Exemptions in Environmental Laws Preserve DoD Training and
Operational Prerogatives without New Legislation?, 54 A.F. L. REV. 65 (2004).
'See infra Part II.D.
9 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318,
117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003). "The RRPI was originally a package of legislative proposals
.... [aiming to] amend six federal environmental statutes to make it easier for DOD to
comply with the statutes." Stephen Dycus, Osama's Submarine: National Security and
Environmental Protection After 9/11, 30 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POLy REV. 1, 12
(2005). The RRPI was proposed by the Department of Defense, and included six separate
proposals, one of which was an amendment to the "critical habitat" designation
procedures of the ESA. Erin Truban, Comment, Military Exemptions from Environmental
Regulations: Unwarranted Special Treatment or Necessary Relief?, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
139,139 (2004). See A.F. INST. OF TECH., READINESS AND RANGE PRESERVATION INITIATIVE
SUMMARY (2002), available at http://www.afit.edu/en/env/Documents/Documents/ENVR
%20511/rrpi%20summary.doc.
'oSee infra Part III.A-B.
"See infra Part III.B.
12 See infra Part I. The U.S. Army will be the focus, as this allows for a more detailed look
into policy development and practices ofone organization. Also, the Army manages about
half of the military's twenty-five million acres in the United States, with all other
services combined managing the other. USALA Report: Environmental Law Division
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Part II outlines the SECDEF's functional authority, including a
discussion of some problem areas, and the evolution of Army environ-
mental policy before 2004.13
Part III discusses the proposal of the RRPI and the passage of the
new ESA amendment, including the concerns of scholars, commentators,
and government officials about the scope of military exemptions to the
ESA that emerged before and in the wake of the 2004 amendments. 4
This Part concludes by reconciling these competing concerns with the
existing SECDEF exemption and the realities of military training and
operational needs.'5 Viewing the history and scope of the 1978 SECDEF
exemption together with the 2004 amendments, the new exemption ap-
pears less as an example of adversarial military -versus-the-environment
policy-making and more as a compromise that promotes military readi-
ness while facilitating and encouraging strict and transparent ESA
compliance.'" Further, it suggests that the proposal of new exemptions
to substantive environmental regulations need not always classically pit
environmentalists against military officials and policy makers.
I. A HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND
ITS EXEMPTIONS
A. The Endangered Species Act of 1973: From Early Environmental
Legislation to Tellico Dam
When the ESA was enacted in 1973, it was hardly the first piece
of legislation that attempted to afford protection to endangered or
threatened species at the federal level. Wildlife management was trad-
itionally under exclusive state control and addressed through hunting
regulations and the common law of property; it did not become federally
regulated until the late nineteenth century.17 At the federal level, legal
Notes, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1998, at 36, 37 n.9 (citing RAND NATL DEF. REs. INST., MORE
THAN 25 MILLION ACRES? DOD AS A FEDERAL, NATURAL, AND CULTURAL RESOURCE
MANAGER 4 (1996)).
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part III.
'5 See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part III.C.
17 BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HISTORY,
CONSERVATION, BIOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15-17 (2001). See also STANFORD ENVTL.
LAW Soc'Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 14-16 (2001). See generally MICHAEL J. BEAN
& MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 7-38 (3d ed. 1997).
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justification for wildlife regulation came from several theories, but
Congress's commerce power, and the federal treaty and property powers,
emerged as the most expansive. 8
Despite success with limited species- or location-specific legis-
lation, by 1966, the stage was set for more comprehensive protection of
threatened species. 9 The Endangered Species Preservation Act, passed
in that year, was Congress's "first comprehensive legislative attempt to
prevent human-caused extinctions." ° However, its provisions were in-
sufficient to achieve its purpose2' due to its application only to federal
land, its exclusion of plants and invertebrates, and the lack of compul-
sory compliance by federal agencies.22
Congress attempted to broaden the scope of protection, while
remedying some of these ills, with the Endangered Species Conservation
Act of 1969.23 This legislation was meant to supplement the 1966 Act by
sharply limiting trade in endangered animals or animal products, inc-
luding species threatened globally, and broadening protections to include
invertebrates and other previously unprotected species.24
By the early 1970s, the 1966 and 1969 Acts had proved inade-
quate to meet changing demands; public sentiment was changing, and
with the recently signed Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna25 ("CITES") and the backing of
's BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 17-27. These three legal models provide separate
theories for justifying federal regulation: The "federal property power," at a minimum,
allows for federal regulation of wildlife on federal lands or the species living there. Id.
at 19-22. Congress's commerce power vests power where wildlife impacts interstate
commerce. Id. at 23-25. The treaty-making power makes duly enacted treaties a
"suprem[e]" source of wildlife regulation. Id. at 17-19.19 See STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOC'y, supra note 17, at 15-19; des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 834-37.
20 STANFORD ENVTL. L. Soc'Y, supra note 17, at 18 (citing the Endangered Species Act of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973)).
" des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 835-36. "The 1966 Act was modest in scope; it authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to review this agency's existing programs to protect endangered
species and to implement those programs only 'to the extent practicable,... in furtherance
of the purpose of this [1966] Act." Id. at 835 (quoting the Endangered Species Preservation
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973)).
22 STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOC'Y, supra note 17, at 18-19.
2 See id. at 19 (citing the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969)).
24 Id.
25 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 244, available at http://cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml.
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President Nixon, the time was right to pass more substantial legislation.26
Congress passed the ESA in 1973 with no significant opposition in the
House or Senate, or from the public at large.27 In addition to engendering
wide support, the ESA went further than either of the previous two Acts
in the protection of endangered species;2" almost all species were now
included,2 9 and compliance by federal agencies was compulsory and not
subject to a "practicability requirement."30 Also significant was the
provision for citizen suits under the ESA, which permitted any person
to bring suit to enjoin actions believed to violate the Act or, where there
is an alleged failure to perform certain non-discretionary duties, to
compel protective action by the Secretary of the Interior.31 As a result,
the ESA was then, and still is, "'the broadest and most powerful law' in
the world for the protection of species."32
The purpose of this Note is not to delve into the extensive and well-
documented history of the ESA; others have done so in great depth and
detail.33 However, it should be noted that Congress's intent in creating the
ESA-to create sweeping, nearly absolute protection of endangered
species-was clear from the start.' This was bolstered by subsequent
judicial interpretation, represented by the line of cases brought under the
"Interagency Cooperation" section (Section 7) of the ESA35 between 1973
and 1978, which "reflect[ed] the gradual recognition of the strong pro-
endangered species congressional policy embodied in Section 7."36
26 des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 836-37. See STANFORD ENVTL. L. Soc'y, supra note 17, at 20.
27 STANFORD ENVTL. L. Soc'y, supra note 17, at 20-21. "No special interest group came
forward to oppose the ESA, no commercial interest testified in either House or Senate
hearings, and no organized lobby countered the environmental supporters of the ESA."
Id. at 21.
28 See des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 837-40.
29 Id. at 837-38 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (5), (9) (1976)).
30 Id. at 838. The disallowance of agency "balancing" was a more a function of subsequent
judicial interpretation which determined that the absence of a specific balancing test
precluded this reasoning. Id. at 838-43. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
31 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).
32 STANFORD ENVTL. L. Soc'k, supra note 17, at 10 (quoting NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, SCIENCE
AND THE ENDANGERED SPEcIEs ACT 1 (1995)).33 See, e.g., BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 193-276; CZECH & KRAUSMAN, supra note 17.
' des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 839.
31 Section 7 of the ESA, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536, is entitled "Interagency
Cooperation," and specifies the requirements of federal agencies in complying with the
ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006). The exemption process is included in this section. Id. §
1536(e)-(k).
36 Ronald H. Rosenberg, Federal Protection of Unique Environmental Interests: Endangered
and Threatened Species, 58 N.C. L. REV. 491,507-16 (1980). See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(c) (2006).
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One case in particular deserves specific mention, first because it is
the most important of the early ESA cases, and also because it served as
the impetus for Congress's subsequent creation of the exemption process.37
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1978, can be viewed as the completion of the judiciary's gradual recogni-
tion of, and willingness to enforce, Congress's strict and sweeping intent
in enacting the ESA.3' The species at issue was the tiny snail darter, a
small recently-discovered fish that had the potential to halt the Tellico
Dam project on the Little Tennessee River.3 9 The dam had been under
construction and receiving federal funding since 1966.40 Subsequently, the
snail darter was discovered, and it was later listed as an endangered
species in 1975, with the section of the Tennessee River it inhabited being
"designated a critical habitat."4' This clearly presented the question,
eventually to the U.S. Supreme Court, of whether an ongoing project that
was specifically funded and authorized by Congress even before the
enactment of the ESA, was nevertheless subject to the Act's require-
ments.42 In answering with a forceful "yes," the Supreme Court ruled that
the congressional intent behind the ESA was clear: "species extinction was
to be avoided 'whatever the cost' and endangered species were to be
accorded 'priority over the "primary missions" of federal agencies.'"43 This
ruling "practically invited" Congress to amend the ESA, which they did,
creating the exemption process only four months later."
B. The Creation of the Exemption Process
The Court's ruling in TVA v. Hill made it clear that changes to
the ESA were necessary to avoid the frustration of future federal
actions.45 Some members of Congress were surprised by the plain
language in their own law, and had simply not previously appreciated
the expansive nature of the legislation they had passed only five years
"7 Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 512-16.
381 Id. at 512-16. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see also des Rosiers,
supra note 3, at 841-43.
" Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 512-13.
40 Id. at 512.
41 Id. at 512-13.
42 Id. at 513-15.
43 Id. at 514 (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 184-85).
44 Id. at 516.
41 See des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 843-44; Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 516.
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earlier.46 There were initially several recommendations for amending the
Act. Some Congressmen recommended a specific exemption for the
Tellico Dam, while others recommended the elimination of Section 7
altogether.47 Another suggestion was to reintroduce the practicability
language to the ESA that had been so deliberately removed after the
failure of the 1966 and 1969 Acts.48 In rejecting these courses of action,
Congress instead amended Section 7 to create a permanent procedural
work-around that would provide the flexibility to prevent future
impasses such as Tellico Dam.49
The first and most substantial of the amendments was the
creation of the Endangered Species Committee ("Committee" or "God
Squad"), which was empowered to grant exemptions from the require-
ments of the ESA for agency actions that would otherwise violate the
Act.5° However, the flexibility that the Committee provided was sharply
limited. The process is specified as follows: First, the federal agency
involved must consult with the Secretary of the Interior about its course
of action, and the Secretary must determine whether or not the action
would "jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of such species .... 51 If the Secretary finds that the action is
prohibited under the ESA, the agency would then be required to conduct
a biological assessment in order to apply for an exemption, generally in
concert with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to determine the action's
potential impact on threatened or endangered species.52 The Secretary
of the Interior would then receive the application upon completion of the
" David N. Diner, The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering
Whom?, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, 181 (1994). Surprisingly, until TVA v. Hill was decided,
many Congressmen believed that the ESA only protected "eagles, bears, condors, and
other popular, high-profile animals," not the unassuming snail darter. Id. at 181 n. 132
(citing Lynn A. Greenwalt, The Power and Potential of the Act, in BALANCING ON THE
BRINK OF EXTINCTION 31, 32 (Kathyrn A. Kohm ed., 1991)).
4 des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 843.
4Id. at 843 n.125.49 Id. at 843-44. See Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 516-23; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
o See des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 843-45; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(n) (2006).
51 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(b) (2006).
52 Id. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 451.02 (2006). It should be noted that compliance with this
provision may also be satisfied by meeting the requirements of section 102 of the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).
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biological assessment and, upon ensuring that certain baseline require-
ments are met, refer the exemption application to the Committee. 3
Once the application has been forwarded to the Committee, it will
be evaluated based on four criteria: (1) the existence of "reasonable...
alternatives,"54 (2) whether the "benefits of such action clearly outweigh
the benefits of [any] alternative [s]" (and whether the proposal "is in the
public interest"), 55 (3) the proposal's "regional or national significance," 6
and (4) assurance that there had been no "irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources . . . ."" If these requirements are met, the
Committee may grant an exemption with approval of at least five of its
seven members.5"
In addition to the creation of the "God Squad," Congress provided
two other significant amendments. First, it allowed the Secretary of
53 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (2006). Before forwarding the application, the Secretary of the
Interior would ensure that the applicant had
(i) carried out the consultation responsibilities described in subsection
(a) of this section in good faith and made a reasonable and responsible
effort to develop and fairly consider modifications or reasonable and
prudent alternatives... ;
(ii) conducted any biological assessment required by subsection (c)... ; and
(iii) to the extent determinable . . . , refrained from making any
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources prohibited by
subsection (d) ....
Id. § 1536(g)(3)(a)(i)-(iii). If these requirements are satisfied, the Secretary of the Interior
will then prepare a report to accompany the application to the Committee that explains:
(A) the availability of reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action, and the nature and extent of the benefits of the agency
action and of alternative[s] ... ;
(B) a summary of the evidence concerning whether or not the agency
action is in the public interest and is of national or regional
significance;
(C) appropriate reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures
which should be considered... ; and
(D) whether the ... agency... and the exemption applicant refrained
from making any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources
prohibited by subsection (d).
Id. § 1536(g)(5)(A)-(D).
5 Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i).
51 Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii).
56 Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iii).
57 Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iv). The Committee must also "establish... reasonable mitigation
and enhancement measures" to proceed with an exemption after the other criteria are
met. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(B).58Id. § 1536(h)(1). See id. § 1536(e)(3).
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State to keep applications from being considered by the Committee in
cases of a possible international treaty violation.59 The second significant
amendment was the national security exemption, which allowed the
Secretary of Defense to direct the Committee to grant an exemption if
deemed necessary for "reasons of national security."6"
With these new exemptions in place, the Tellico Dam controversy,
which was still simmering, now had a potential vehicle for positive
resolution for the TVA (and Congress).6 Both the Tellico Dam project
and the Grey Rocks Dam Project in Wyoming, which had similarly been
halted because of a potential threat to whooping cranes, were considered
for exemptions almost immediately after passage of the 1978 amend-
ments.62 The Committee granted an exemption in the case of the Grey
Rocks Dam, but not in the case of Tellico Dam.6
The immediate use of the"God Squad" exemption process seemed
to be a natural result of Congress's response to TVA v. Hill.' However,
two significant observations are worth noting about the Committee's
first decisions. First, Congress moved so quickly to resolve the Tellico issue
that they short-circuited the procedural requirements-the Secretary of the
Interior's evaluation and report-for sending the applications to the
'9 Id. § 1536(i).
' Id. § 1536(j). This provision appears on its face to be a broad grant of power to the
Secretary of Defense, simply due to the absolute and unqualified language. The full text
of the provision is:
(j) Exemption for national security reasons. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this chapter, the Committee shall grant an exemption for
any agency action if the Secretary of Defense finds that such exemption
is necessary for reasons of national security.
Id.
61 It should be noted that additional amendments to the ESA were passed in 1979 and
1982 that altered some of the procedural exemption requirements without substantially
changing the exemptions themselves. See des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 848-50 & n.163.
Important to this discussion is the 1982 change to the "threshold review" process
discussed supra note 53. Id. at 849-50 n.163. Originally, this review was conducted by
a three-person board which included the Secretary of the Interior and was allowed sixty
days for completion. Id. After the amendment, the Secretary of the Interior alone made
the determination and was given only twenty days to do so. Id. An original fourth factor
of consideration, "whether an irresolvable conflict exists," was also eliminated. Id. See
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982).
62Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 75.
Id. at 75; des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 846.
64 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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Endangered Species Committee.65 Although the substantive guidelines of
the Committee's evaluation criteria were used in making its decision," it
is significant that the Secretary of the Interior's baseline determinations,
which appear to have been intended as a substantial procedural
safeguard in the exemption process, were "sidestepped" by Congress."7
Secondly, it is important to note that the immediate use of the Commit-
tee to resolve these two cases was not followed by a flood of subsequent
requests for ESA exemptions.6" In fact, the Committee has met only once
since the Tellico/Gray Rocks decisions-this time concerning the spotted
owl in Oregon-and the Committee granted the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment a limited exemption for old-growth timber sales in 1992.69 While
these two points are significant to a general understanding of the ultimate
effect of the 1978 amendments, their effect will be more germane when the
focus shifts to the national security exemption specifically.
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION: A FUNCTIONAL FRAME-
WORK OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S AUTHORITY AFTER 1978
With the statutory guidelines and process already discussed above,7"
a functional analysis of the national security exemption is itself somewhat
more difficult than it first appears. The sparse statutory language' makes
the Secretary's authority appear straightforward. However, actually
marking the functional limits of this power is more problematic. First,
because the power has never been used,72 the Secretary of Defense has
never made an official determination of what constitutes "reasons of
national security"73 in this context, and such a determination has thus
never been subjected to legislative, judicial, or public scrutiny. Secondly,
" des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 846. For details on the procedural requirements, see supra
notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 846. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
67 des Rosiers, supra note 3, at 846.
Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 75-76.
69 Id. at 75-76. See generally John Lowe Weston, Comment, The Endangered Species
Committee and the Northern Spotted Owl: Did the "God Squad" Play God?, 7 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 779 (1993).
70 See supra Part I.B.
7 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this
chapter, the Committee shall grant an exemption ... if the Secretary of Defense finds that
such exemption is necessary for reasons of national security." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2006).
72 Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 74.
'3 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2006).
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no citizen or group has attempted to enjoin the military's activities after
an exemption has been issued, either through the applicable citizen suit
provisions of the ESA74 or through the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA").75 Last, and perhaps ironically, the military has tied its own
hands to some degree. Even when presented with opportunities to
officially ask the Secretary to exempt certain activities, the military has
instead either conformed the activities to the ESA or relied upon favorable
court rulings to sustain them.76 This Part discusses these problem areas
and articulates a functional definition of the Secretary of Defense's
exemption authority.
A. "Reasons of National Security"
The Secretary of Defense's determination of "reasons of national
security" is the first unsettled area of this analysis. Contributing to the
difficulty here is the fact that the Secretary has no other exemptions to
major substantive environmental statutes,78 which makes analogizing
to determine the relevant factors difficult. ' s
Considerable debate exists as to what national security interests
are or should be, even among those who agree that the concept encom-
passes more than the physical defense of the homeland from military
threats. President George W. Bush announced in 2002 that the aim of the
Administration's National Security Strategy ("Strategy") was to "help make
the world not just safer but better," advocating "a distinctly American
74 Two separate provisions apply here. The first is the general citizen suit provision of 16
U.S.C § 1540(g), discussed at supra note 25 and the accompanying text. The second is the
"judicial review" provision of section 7 that specifically allows for citizen lawsuits seeking
federal-court judicial review of Endangered Species Committee decisions. 16 U.S.C. §
1536(n) (2006).
75 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47. U.S. Code Title 42 Chapter 55 includes several provisions that
are not "generally considered part of NEPA." RUTH S. MUSGRAVE ET AL., FEDERAL
WILDLIFE LAWS HANDBOOK 378 (Edwina Crawford & Carolyn Byers eds., 1998). See
discussion infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text.76 See infra Part II.C-D.
77 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j).71 See Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 65-85.
7' The Secretary of Defense has one other limited exemption for "Emergency Miliary
Construction" in cases of war or emergency, which was authorized by Executive Order
in 2001. Id. at 85 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2808). See Exec. Order No. 13,235, 66 Fed. Reg.
58,343 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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internationalism." ° Subsequently, the Administration's definition of nat-
ional security interests sparked significant debate among commentators.
Supporters claim the Strategy is the best way to ensure security in a post-
9/11 world, some arguing that "transforming societies" through "safety,
health, prosperity, and freedom" is the best way to protect security
interests."' Others are critical that the Strategy inadequately or inappro-
priately addresses concerns like "environmental security," 2 the threats
posed by HIV/AIDS,"3 and human rights generally." Another view is that
80 GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1 (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002], available at http'/
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. This Strategy delineates eight methods through which
this goal will be attained:
* champion aspirations for human dignity;
* strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism...;
* work with others to diffuse regional conflicts;
* prevent our enemies from threatening us... with weapons of
mass destruction;
* ignite a new era of global economic growth through free
markets and free trade;
* expand the circle of development by opening societies and
building the infrastructure of democracy;
* develop agendas for cooperative action with other main
centers of global power; and
• transform America's national security institutions ....
Id. at 1-2. On March 15, 2006, President Bush issued a new National Security Strategy
which restated the preceding eight"essential tasks" and added another, to "[engage the
opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization." GEORGE W. BUSH, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2OO6.pdf. The 2002 Strategy is more
appropriate to consider for this discussion of the disagreement in scholarship over what
"national security" means because legal scholars have had a much greater opportunity
to discuss and respond to the 2002 Strategy in scholarly writing.
" Newt Gingrich & Mark Kester, From Stabilizing to Transforming Societies as the Key
to American Security, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 5, 6-7 (2004), available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum28-2pdfs/gingrich.pdf.
82 Sanford E. Gaines, Sustainable Development and National Security, 30 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 321, 321 (2005).
' See David P. Fidler, Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIVIAIDS, Human Rights, and U.S.
Foreign Policy, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 99 (2004). This concern may be somewhat
mitigated by the 2006 National Security Strategy, which "addresses topics largely left
out of the 2002 version, including a section on genocide and a new chapter on global
threats such as avian influenza, AIDS, environmental destruction and natural disasters."
Peter Baker, Bush to Restate Terror Strategy: 2002 Doctrine of Preemptive War to Be
Reaffirmed, WASH. POST, Mar. 16,2006, at AO1, available at http'J/www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/15/AR2006031502297_pf.html.
8 See William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic
Correlation, 17 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 249, 249 (2004) ("[The Bush Administration's]
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the Strategy reaches too broadly in defining, as important security
interests, priorities such as "increasingly obsolete and irrelevant security
commitments around the globe."8" Some arguments are even more critical,
challenging the constitutionality of the Strategy 6 or claiming that the Ad-
ministration is casting other disputed policy goals as security concerns.8 7
The debate over the nation's security strategy brings passionate
arguments from many camps and is not likely to be an issue of broad
consensus in the political arena. Important to framing the SECDEF's
authority is simply the recognition that national security is difficult to
define. It would probably be difficult to find a consensus among scholars
or officials that categorically excludes any arguable definition. 8 Perhaps
surprisingly, it appears that the Army's understanding that "reasons of
national security" denotes "wartime"9 could be significantly broadened
if the need arose.
In conclusion, the ESA itself provides no statutory guidelines, as
it does for the Endangered Species Committee,90 for determining what
constitutes a national security interest.9' Further, there is no express
subordination of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and strategically
questionable. A more effective U.S. foreign policy would view human rights and national
security as correlated and complementary goals.").
85 Charles V. Pefia, Bush's National Security Strategy: A Global Strategy That
Undermines National Security, 6 J. L. & SOCIAL CHALLENGES 45, 52 (2004) (quoting TED
GALEN CARPENTER, PEACE & FREEDOM 12 (2002)). Pefia argues that the U.S. should
"clear the decks" and focus on the threat posed by al Qaeda. Id.
See Donna M. Davis, Preemptive War and The Legal Limits of National Security Policy,
10 Ius GENTIUM 11, 11-16 (2004).
" See Ann Scales & Laura Spitz, The Jurisprudence of the Military-Industrial Complex,
Lecture at Seattle University (Feb. 27, 2003), in 1 SEATrLE J. SOC. JUST. 541. They
criticize as "lawless" the alleged "moral imperative" status that the Strategy gives "free
trade, . .. that as a matter of National Security the United States will enforce trade
agreements...." Id. at 547.
' Georgia Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney has even proposed that expansion of
federal programs to provide "affordable and quality health care is a matter of national
security for the United States." Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, Current Issues:
Health, http://www.house.gov/mckinney/health.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
89 Diner, supra note 46, at 196 & n.225 (citing an interview with Major Craig Teller,
United States Army Environmental Law Division).
90 The Committee has four criteria that it must consider in granting an exemption. 16
U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (2006). See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. Contrast the four express criteria for the
Committee in 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A), with the unqualified language of the Secretary's
exemption in § 1536(0). This difference will become central to the judicial review and
citizen suit discussion, infra Part II.B.
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limitation on the Secretary to use the exemption only for actions by the
military; it appears that any government agency may request an exemp-
tion for "reasons of national security."
92
B. Judicial Review
These observations lead to the second problematic area: judicial
review-particularly in citizen suits-of an exemption granted by the
Secretary of Defense. In short, there appears to be no review provided
for in the ESA, and very limited opportunities elsewhere.
The ESA itself provides for two possible sources ofjudicial review.93
The first is the general provision for suits against the Secretary of the
Interior, which permits suits in cases of alleged ESA violations to which
the Secretary has not adequately responded.94 This provision, however,
does not provide an avenue forjudicial review of decisions by the Secretary
of Defense. The Secretary of the Interior does have certain responsibili-
ties to fulfill before an exemption application is forwarded, but these
duties are not reviewable under the general citizen suit provision. 95 The
statute provides for suits in cases relating to the Secretary's duties only
in Sections 4, 6, and 9-not Section 7.96
The next possibility for judicial review of the Secretary of
Defense's exemption authority is found in Section 7 itself.97 This avenue
also affords little possibility for a successful citizen suit. The statute
provides for review of all exemptions granted through the Committee,
but it would apply differently to a SECDEF-directed exemption.9" The
four evaluation criteria99 that the committee is required to consider
would most likely provide the basis for judicial review under Section 7.
92 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2006).
9' See supra note 74.
94 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).
95 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(3)-(5) (2006).
' Id. § 1540(g)(1). There is also a provision for suits generally against "any person,
including the United States and any government instrumentality or agency.., who is
alleged to be in violation of any provision of this Act .... Id. § 1540(g)(1)(A). However,
the "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this chapter" language of the SECDEF's
exemption would put it outside the scope of this provision. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j).
9' 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) (2006).
9' The judicial review provision states that, "any person... may obtain judicial review
... of any decision of the Endangered Species Committee under subsection (h) ... ." Id.
The exemption that may be granted by the SECDEF for national security reasons is not
found in subsection (h), but in subsection (j). Id. § 1536(j).
9 Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iv).
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The SECDEF's exemption is based only on his or her determination of
a "reason D of national security,"100 not the four statutory criteria for the
Committee;' the absolute language of the Secretary's exemption
10 2
makes this apparent.
A citizen suit challenging a SECDEF-granted exemption would
further be limited by provisions in the Administrative Procedure Act0 3
("APA"), which provides for review of all "final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court . .".1."4 Review of the
SECDEF's finding of a national security interest would be subject to quite
deferential review by courts, being reversible only if "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."10 5
Further, the APA provides that "military authority exercised in the field
in time of war or in occupied territory"0 6 is not "agency"' 7 action, making
the judicial review provisions' 8 inapplicable in those situations. 10 9
The result is that it appears that the only challenge to the
SECDEF's exemption authority would be the adequacy of the "reasons
of national security,""0 which he or she alone, with no statutory guide-
lines, may determine."' The Section 7 avenue for a suit after an exemp-
tion by the SECDEF is, as a result, extremely limited."2
While considering the possibilities for judicial review, it is important
to address the role of NEPA," 3 primarily because it provides a collateral
review process for environmental decisionmaking that properly falls within
'oo Id. § 1536(j).
1o Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iv).
102 "Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Committee shall grant an
exemption .... "Id. § 1536(j) (emphasis added).
103 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2006).
'04 Id. § 704.
105 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). While deferential to agency decisionmaking in other
contexts, review may be even more so when involving national security concerns. See,
e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("M Jnless Congress specifically
has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.").
'06 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(G), 701(b)(1)(G) (2006).
107 Id. § 551(1).
lo8 Id. §§ 701-04.
109 Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 80 (noting that"[c]ourts have interpreted
this clause narrowly.").19 Id. § 1536(j).
" Recall the discussion of the term "reasons of national security," supra Part II.A.
112 See Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 73-74. "This power [for the Secretary
to grant national security exemptions]... appears to be virtually unlimited." Id. at 74.
The only other such absolute language in the ESA can be found in the Secretary of
State's treaty-violation determination in § 1536(i). Id.
113 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2006).
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the ESA.'14 NEPA was enacted to ensure "harmony between man and his
environment; to.. . prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the
understanding of the [important] ecological systems ... .""' More impor-
tantly, NEPA stands to ensure federal agencies incorporate these concerns
into their decisionmaking processes."'
To accomplish this purpose, agencies, including the military,
must weigh the effects of their actions by conducting an Environmental
Assessment ("EA").17 or drafting an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS")18 before proceeding with activities that may result in environ-
mental harm." 9 While not prescribed by the regulations, 2 ° the Army's
policy is to prepare an EA that results in either the more detailed EIS,
or a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI").12' If potential endan-
gered species issues are encountered in this process, the EIS stage is
where a biological assessment 22 would be conducted.'23
While creating a potentially important avenue for protecting
endangered species through citizen suits,'24 NEPA would not provide a
114 See, e.g., Malama Makua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F.Supp. 2d 1202 (D. Haw. 2001).
115 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
116 Id. § 4332.
117 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2006).
118 Id. § 1502.
119 The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") promulgated regulations to ensure
agency compliance after NEPA was passed. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501-08 (2006). Agencies are
required to establish their own procedures for determining when an EA or EIS is
necessary. Id. § 1507.3(b)(2)(i)-(iii). The Army's policy for NEPA compliance acknowl-
edges NEPA's purpose of "incorporatfing] environmental considerations into federal
agency planning and action," and requires a six-step decision-making process that is
triggered by "mission assignment[s] involv[ing] the potential for construction, or earth
disturbing, or planning on either of those actions . . . ." U.S. Army Environmental
Command, NEPA and the Army, http://aec.army.mil/usaec/nepa/armyOO.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006). Within this process, step four requires the production of a "NEPA
document," which is an EA or EIS. Id.
120 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a) (2006) (noting that individual agencies will produce their
own policy as to when EAS should be conducted). An agency can forgo the EA if it decides
to conduct an EIS. Id.
" U.S. Army Environmental Command, NEPA Glossary, httpJ/aec.army.mil/usaec/nepa/
glossaryO0.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (defining an "Environmental Assessment" as a
means for "determining whether to prepare an EIS or a finding of no significant impact").
The Army policy echoes the general agency procedures described by 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2006).
122 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. This is the document required for
compliance with the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (c) (2006).
123 Telephone Interview with Colonel Charles L. Green, Former Chief, Environmental
Litigation Branch, United States Army Environmental Law Division, in Williamsburg,
Va. (Mar. 20, 2006).
124 The challenge to the Army's NEPA process at Makua Military Reservation ("MMR")
in Hawaii offers a glimpse into the interrelationship between military NEPA and ESA
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substantive avenue for review of an exemption directed by the SECDEF.
Two statutory provisions control. The first is the ESA itself, which
specifies that exemptions issued under Section 7 "shall not be a major
Federal action for purposes of [NEPA]... :Provided, That an... [EIS]
which discusses the impacts upon endangered species or threatened
species or their critical habitats shall have been previously prepared
with respect to [the exempted action]."125 Because the EIS requirement
in NEPA applies to "major federal actions,"'26 the Army would only have
to show that they had conducted an EIS with respect to the action at
some point prior to the grant of an exemption."' The EIS stage of the
Army NEPA planning process is where potential endangered species
issues are addressed. 2 ' As a result, training activities which are
proposed for an ESA exemption would normally meet this requirement.
The second potential statutory bar to a NEPA suit reversing an
ESA exemption is the "emergency circumstances" exception found in the
Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") regulations implementing
NEPA.'29 In such circumstances, the Defense Department "should
consult with the [CEQI about alternative arrangements," 3 ' but activities
would be exempted only if they were "necessary to control the immediate
impacts of the emergency."' This provision has been relied upon for
military activities in the past, most notably to exempt increased Air
compliance. See Malama Makua v. Rumsfeld, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D. Haw. 2001). In
this case, the plaintiffs questioned the adequacy of the Army's EA and FONSI in
considering the effects of military training and resulting wild fires on MMR's forty-one
endangered species. Id. at 1202-09. Makua secured a preliminary injunction against
"live-fire [military] training," which resulted in settlement agreements between the
parties to continue more limited military activities. Id. at 1222. See Earthjustice,
Biological and Cultural Treasures at Makua to be Protected, http://www.earthjustice
.org/our work/victory/biological and_cultural treasuresat makua-tobeprotected.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006); Press Release, Earthjustice, Citizens and Military Reach
Settlement in Makua Lawsuit (Mar. 31, 2004), http'//www.earthjustice.org/news/press/
004/citizensandmilitary reach_settlement in makualawsuit.htm. In February of
2006, the District Court denied the Army's request to resume "live-fire training... [for]
soldiers scheduled to leave for Iraq," observing that the Army's EIS was still not
complete. Malama Makua v. Rumsfeld, Civil No. 00-00813, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3962,
at *25 (D. Haw. 2006).
125 16 U.S.C. § 1536(k) (2006).
126 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2006).
127 16 U.S.C. § 1536(k) (2006). In substance, this simplifies the EIS requirement by not
requiring a new EIS after an exemption is granted.
12 See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text; Telephone Interview with Colonel
Charles L. Green, supra note 123; NEPA and the Army, supra note 119.
129 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2006). See Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 80-81.
130 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11.
131 Id.
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Force flight operations resulting from Operation Desert Storm in 1990.132
In that situation, "[t]he [existing] EIS provided that no military activity
"133
would be routinely scheduled between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m .....
The case reached the District Court, and, in ruling for the Air Force, the
issue was confined to what "constituted an emergency sufficient to
circumvent the EIS requirement," as "the parties ... never contended
that an EIS was essential under all circumstances.
" 134
Summarizing, the ESA provides for very limited judicial review
of the Secretary's determination of a national security interest.13 NEPA
provides no substantive collateral opportunity for challenging an exemp-
tion.136 Additionally, any remaining avenue for a suit is further limited
by the terms of the APA. 137 As a result, the exercise of the exemption
authority is virtually unchecked by the judiciary.
C. The Choice Not to Pursue Exemptions in the Face of ESA
Compliance Issues
The last area that makes analysis of the exemption problematic is
the military's historical unwillingness to seek exemptions from the
Secretary of Defense for its activities. This is not to say that the military
has never benefitted from deferential treatment for their own determina-
tions of necessity in military training or national defense, only that an
official exemption has not been sought. 3 s This is at least partially due to
the Army's view that the exemption is for "wartime" only.139 As a result,
the argument exists that the exemption process has simply not been
necessary for the military to achieve its training and operational
objectives."4 Another argument states that no new ESA exemptions are
needed for the military, such as those passed in the National Defense
132 Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 81 (citing Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't
v. Vest, [1991] 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20,355 (D. Mass. 1991)).
133 Id.
134 Id.
'3' See supra notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
" See Scott M. Palatucci, Comment, The Effectiveness of Citizen Suits in Preventing the
Environment from Becoming a Casualty of War, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 585, 591 (2004).
13' Diner, supra note 46, at 196 & n.225 (citing an interview with Major Craig Teller,
United States Army Environmental Law Division).
"4 Palatucci, supra note 138, at 591. "mhe National Defense Exemption [to the ESA]...
has proven to be quite unnecessary given how the military has otherwise triumphed over
citizen suits brought under the ESA." Id.
272 [Vol. 31:255
NATIONAL SECURITY & THE ESA
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,14' because the existing exemption
is sufficient and has never been used.'42 Both of these approaches
minimize the role that the military's environmental policy choices have
played in the process.'43 Because these concerns will be more fully
addressed in later sections of this Note,'" it is sufficient at this stage to
simply point out that the military has had several opportunities in which
to seek exemptions, but has not done so.
145
D. The Red-Cockaded Woodpecker at Fort Bragg: A Case Study in
Endangered Species Management and the U.S. Army
To illustrate the military's posture towards endangered species
management, a brief case study involving the U.S. Army and the red-
cockaded woodpecker is included in this section to show the evolution of
military ESA compliance after 1978.
The red-cockaded woodpecker ("RCW") has been described as "the
most substantial ESA challenge facing the Army."'46 The RCW's primary
habitat is open pine forests with older trees, with a historical range
stretching from East Texas to Virginia, as far south as Florida, and as far
north as Kentucky and southern Missouri. 147 The RCW was listed as an
endangered species in 1970 after habitat loss resulting from deforestation
"precipitated dramatic declines" in their population.'" Further, military
training lands were becoming more important to endangered species
conservation generally, 4 9 and by 1992, eighty-four percent of the 3,000-
9,000 remaining RCWs lived on public land, which included eight military
reservations. 5 ° The military would clearly play an important role in the
recovery of the RCW.
... National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, 117
Stat. 1392 (2003).
142 See Stephen Dycus, Environmental Baby, Terrorist Bath Water, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 2002,
available at httpJ/www.vermontlaw.edu/media/emp-mednew-template.cfin?doc_id=544.
'"See Diner, supra note 46, at 196-223.
'"See infra Part III.B.
1"Diner, supra note 46, at 196-223.
'46 Id. at 204.
141 NAT'L BIOLOGICAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OUR LIVING RESOURCES: A
REPORT TO THE NATION ON THE DISTRIBUTION, ABUNDANCE, AND HEALTH OF U.S. PLANTS,
ANIMALS, AND ECOSYSTEMS (E.T. LaRoe et al. eds., 1995), available at http://biology.usgs.
gov/s+t/noframe/b240.htm.
148 Id.
' See generally Sharon E. Riley, The Wolf at the Door: Competing Land Use Values on
Military Installations, 153 MIL. L. REV. 95 (1996).
"5 Diner, supra note 46, at 200-01.
20061 273
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
The Army was forced to directly confront the RCW issue at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, where military training was directly impacting
RCW habitat.15 Fort Bragg was generally uncooperative with attempts to
protect RCW habitat through the 1970s and 1980s, even though, by 1984,
the Army had adopted forestry guidelines for RCW habitat that applied
to installations nationwide. 152 In 1988, the Fish and Wildlife Service
informed Fort Bragg officials of their concerns about training-related
habitat degradation, which led to a 1989 Army-led biological assess-
ment. 113 The team the Army sent to investigate found extensive training-
related violations of the existing Army RCW policy.TM Fort Bragg's
response was "combative," insisting that troops should be allowed to train
"without environmental consideration." 5' In 1990, this situation came to
a boiling point with the FWS issuing a finding that led to severe restric-
tions on training.5 6 The Army was subsequently sued under citizen-suit
provisions of the ESA for alleged violations. 57 This led to the FWS issuing
a "jeopardy opinion" in 1992, requiring military officials to sharply limit
training and develop a better management plan.5 s
It would not be accurate to characterize Fort Bragg's reaction to
the FWS finding as mere obstinance. The Army's XVIII Airborne Corps
and 82nd Airborne Division are both headquartered at Fort Bragg, and
their combat readiness, largely the result of training on Fort Bragg's
51 Id. at 205-06. The Army also dealt with ESA compliance issues concerning the RCW
at Fort Benning, Georgia. There, RCA protection had been addressed as a function of
forest management, and officials were unaware of their responsibilities and the level of
resources the problem required until a FWS investigation eventually led to the 1992
indictments of three Army civilian forestry employees for charges relating to the
unlawful taking of RCW. Id. at 204-05. The Fort Benning situation is somewhat less
germane to the discussion here because compliance issues were not directly related to
military training, but were the result of other management practices. See id.
152 Id. at 205-08.
153 Id. at 206.
154 Id.155 Id. at 207 & n.280 (quoting the findings of Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John H. Beasley,
former Chief of the Army's Environmental Litigation Branch, in The Army and the Red-
Cockaded Woodpecker: Managing an Endangered Species 93 (1991) (unpublished M. Laws
thesis, George Washington University)). Major Diner goes on to note Beasley's observation
that Fort Bragg may have been inviting conflict with the Fish and Wildlife Service to
bolster an attempt to use the national security exemption. Id. at 93 n.280.156 Id. at 207 & n.284.
157 Id. at 207.
151 Matthew Weinstock, Bird Watchers, GOvT EXEC., Oct. 1, 2002, available at httpJvww
.govexec.com/features/100211002s4.htm. The FWS opinion "had a significant impact on
training at Fort Bragg. The Army had to close some shooting ranges and totally redesign
other training sites. Strict limits were placed on the movements of vehicles and soldiers." Id.
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167,000 (primarily forested) acres,'59 contributed greatly to military
successes in Panama and Desert Storm. 6 ° With new development
surrounding the reservation, some officials believed that the fact that
Fort Bragg was left largely wooded made it part of the solution to
problems like habitat depletion.' 6 ' Thus, the FWS opinion was surpris-
ing; although the Army may have been doing better than some surround-
ing landowners,'62 the effects of their training activities were of greater
magnitude than officials had acknowledged. 6 '
Whatever the reasons, the FWS findings led to significant
changes in Fort Bragg's protection of RCW on its training lands. The
Army's response to the FWS findings was fast and successful, becoming
one of the Army's biggest success stories in endangered species manage-
ment. '4 The Army began cooperating in developing effective management
practices with the FWS, which led to many restrictions being lifted.'65
Further, the Army, FWS, and other conservation groups established a
partnership, forming what would become the North Carolina Sandhills
Conservation Partnership ("Partnership").' 6 The Partnership looked
beyond short-term training and range use changes to the implementa-
tion of a long-term cooperative strategy for the conservation of RCW and
the threatened ecosystem.'
67
Despite the positive momentum, the situation was becoming more
dire, as "private land was being developed at such a fast pace that the
red-cockaded woodpeckers were flocking to Fort Bragg." '68 To counter
159 Id.
6
' See generally XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Office of the Command Historian,
XVIII Airborne Corps History, http'//www.bragg.army.mil/history/CorpsHistory.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006).
161 See Weinstock, supra note 158.
162 See id. Katherine Skinner, then the Executive Director of the Nature Conservancy's
North Carolina chapter, acknowledged that Fort Bragg did 'such a great job of taking
care of the trees," doing "perhaps better than most private land owners." Id. Skinner
noted that "[wihen the dust settled, they took the problem very seriously." Id.
163id.
" See Dycus, Osama's Submarine, supra note 9, at 25 (noting the Army's "pride" in its
management of the RCW).166 Weinstock, supra note 158.
166 U.S. Army Environmental Command, Private Lands Initiative: Addressing Encroach-
ment with Cooperative Agreements and Conservation, http://aec.army.mil/usaec/natura
natural03a04.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
167 Id.
16 Weinstock, supra note 158. This phenomenon, generally termed "[e]ncroachment," is
defined as "the cumulative impact of pressures placed on military installations and
ranges and the surrounding communities and environmental controls resulting from
growing development and urbanization around military facilities, increasing regulatory
burdens, and competition for air, land, water, energy, radio spectrum, and other
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the effect of "encroachment,"'69 military officials and the Nature Conser-
vancy formed the Private Lands Initiative ("PLI").170 This program went
beyond the implementation of protections on Fort Bragg itself. Both
organizations contributed $7 million each to purchase over 3,000 acres
as a "buffer" between Fort Bragg's training areas and the development
surrounding the installation.171 PLI provided benefits to both the RCW
and the military; the lands would be managed by the Army and available
for limited military training while providing additional sanctuary for
RCW.'7 2 As of 2002, several other parcels of land had been identified,
with a total cost of about $50 million, and may be purchased under the
PLI in the future.' 3
In 2003, the North Carolina chapter of the Nature Conservancy
awarded Fort Bragg and the Army Environmental Center ("AEC") with
North Carolina Conservation Leadership Awards for their efforts in pre-
serving the RCW, most notably the PLI.174 Katherine Skinner, the North
Carolina chapter's executive director, said "[tihanks to the efforts of the
U.S. Army Environmental Center and Fort Bragg, endangered species
management and military training are no longer mutually exclusive."'7
The Army has confronted endangered species management issues
numerous times since the ESA was passed,'76 and the RCW at Fort
resources." Envtl. Council of the States and Dep't of Def. Sustainability Workgroup,
Compatible Use and Sustainability Plan 1 (Sept. 2004) (draft), available at http://www.
ecos.org/files/1248-fileDraftStrategicPlanCompatibleUseSustainability.doc. The
Department of Defense has defined "encroachment as the cumulative effect of outside
impediments to testing of weapons and training for our nation's fighting forces."
REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., U.S. SENATE, THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMISM ON
MILITARY READINESS: THE ENCROACHMENT PROBLEM 2 (2003), available at http://www.
senate.gov/-rp/releases/2003/df040103.pdf.
169 See supra note 168.
170 See Weinstock, supra note 158; Christopher Joyce, Fort Bragg's Woodpeckers: Sol-
diers, Wildlife Find Common Ground in North Carolina (May 9, 2002), http://www.npr
.org/programs/morning/features/2002/may/woodpecker/index.html. The partnership
forming the PLI was really an evolution of the North Carolina Sandhills Conservation
Partnership, so the cooperation of these organizations was not new in 2002. See Eleanore
Hajian, The Nature Conservancy Honors Fort Bragg, U.S. Army Environmental Center,
ENVTL. UPDATE, Summer 2003, available at http://aec.army.mil/usaec/publicaffairs/
update/sum03/sumO3O3.html.
171 Joyce, supra note 170.
'
72 Id.; Weinstock, supra note 158.
'
73 Weinstock, supra note 158.
174 Hajian, supra note 170.
175 Id.
176 See Diner, supra note 46, at 198-220. Diner cites three specific examples: the RCW,
the Mexican Gray Wolf, and the Desert Tortoise. Id. In 1992, the Army published a new
environmental strategy which found that a total of 100 threatened or endangered species
were found on sixty-three Army installations. Id. at 198 (citing UNITED STATEs ARMY,
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Bragg may be the Army's biggest, although hardly the only, environmen-
tal success story. 177 Coincidentally, the Army's success with the preserva-
tion of the RCW, most notably through the creation of the PLI, was
recognized by the environmental community while RRPI was being
proposed and debated in Congress.' Despite the changes in the military's
policy that had spelled success at Fort Bragg and other installations,
many distrusted attempts by the military and the Bush Administration
to obtain additional exemptions.'7 While the impacts of the RRPI, or any
general exception to the ESA, potentially affect endangered species at
every U.S. military installation, the positive policy changes that mani-
fested in the PLI at Fort Bragg are evidence that the Army's environ-
mental stewardship is not on a collision course with endangered species
preservation. Further, since the proposal and passage of the RRPI, the
Army has issued a new sustainability-focused environmental policy,
citing the progress at Fort Bragg as a model for environmental steward-
ship on other installations.8 0
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (1992)). By 2002,.there were a
total of 170 endangered species occupying ninety-four Army facilities. National Defense
Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year2003: Hearing on Sections 2015-16, 2107(a)-(b), 2018-19
of S. 225 before the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of General John M. Keane, Vice Chief of Staff, United Sates Army)
[hereinafter Statement of General Keane, 2002], available at http://epw.senate.gov/
107th/Keane_070902.htm.
177 See Dycus, Osama's Submarine, supra note 9, at 25 (citingProgrammatic Consultation
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service at Camp Pendleton, California (n.d.), available
at http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/PublicES-Programs/Conservation/Success/note6.html).178 See id. at 1-12.
179 See Joyce, supra note 170.
The Pentagon and its supporters in Congress are trying to win the
right to violate environmental laws on military reservations. They say
rules that protect.., endangered species cripple their ability to train
soldiers .... In North Carolina, however, the people who run [Fort
Bragg] ... have found that the endangered species laws actually help
them do their job.
Id.
[Tlhe... Bush Administration's . . . attacks on the critical habitat
protections in the Endangered Species Act . . . warrant priority
attention from the environmental movement .... [The proposed new
approach] to economic impact analysis . . . . could provide the
foundation for weakening not just critical habitat protection, but the
full array of protections provided.., by the ESA ....
Michael Senatore, John Kostyack & Andrew Wetzler, Critical Habitat at the Crossroads:
Responding to the G. W. Bush Administration's Attacks on Critical Habitat Designation
Under the ESA, 33 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv 447, 447-49 (2003).
" Raymond J. Fatz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Commentary, The Army's
New Strategy for the Environment, ENvTL. UPDATE, Spring 2004, available at http'/
aec.army.mil/usaec/publicaffairs/update/spr04/spr403.html. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE
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The SECDEF's exemption authority, and the effect of its use on
the military or the environment, is difficult to predict because it has
never been used. The conditions under which it would be invoked are
unknown, and the public's reaction to its use is difficult to gauge. If the
military was to request an exemption, this uncertainty may be resolved
by the actors involved, the political climate, or public perception. What
is clear, however, is that the SECDEF's ability to use the exemption is
based on his definition or interpretation of "reasons of national security."
Further, judicial review will not provide any substantial check on the
SECDEF's decision to grant an exemption. Lastly, the military has not
requested exemptions in the past, even when environmental stewardship
was not receiving the priority it does today. Considering the history and
scope of the SECDEF's national security exemption and the military's
policies, the impacts of the RRPI can be placed in proper perspective.
III. THE RRPI AND "CRITICAL HABITAT": EVALUATING THE
NEW AMENDMENT IN LIGHT OF THE EXISTING MILITARY
EXEMPTION PROCESS
Parts I and II provided an introduction to the history of the ESA,
the SECDEF's national security exemption, and a glimpse into the
evolution of the Army's environmental policy. This Part begins with a
brief description of the changes to critical habitat requirements for the
military that were passed as a part of the 2004 Defense Authorization
Bill. 1 ' This is followed by a discussion of the debate between scholars
and other commentators about military ESA compliance that sur-
rounded, and resulted from, this new legislation."8 2 This Part concludes
by reconciling the history of the ESA exemption process with the evolution
of Army policy, suggesting that the recent critical habit exemption may be
a compromise that benefits both the military's combat readiness and
endangered species protection.1"
A. The Passage of the New Military "Critical Habitat" Procedures
Changes to the military's "critical habitat" requirements were
passed as a part of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act."s To
ARMY STRATEGY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SUSTAIN THE MISSION-SECURE THE FUTURE
(2004), available at https'//www.asaie.army.mil/Public/ESOH/docArmyEnvStrategy.pdf.
181 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318,
117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003).
182 See infra Part III.B.
i See infra Part III.C.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318,
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appreciate the substance of the change, one must first understand the
history and role of the critical habitat process.
The term "critical habitat," while already present in the ESA, was
first defined by the FWS in its 1978 regulations" 5 as "any air, land, or
water area... and constituent elements thereof, the loss of which would
appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a
listed species."'86 The 1978 legislative amendments to the ESA, which
created the exemption process in Section 7, defined "critical habitat..
[as] embrac [ing] the concept of 'conservation." 87 This was significantly
more inclusive than the existing "survival and recovery" approach under
the FWS regulations. 8 After the change, the ESA required that the
Secretary of the Interior designate critical habitat "to the maximum
extent prudent and determinable,"' preferably at the time of listing,
but also at any time "thereafter as appropriate." 9 ° The designation was
to be made for lands "essential to the conservation of the species and...
which may require special management,"' 9' determined "on the basis of
the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the
economic impact, and any other relevant impact.. .. 9" Critical habitat
protection is viewed by many as providing broader protection for
endangered species than the Section 7 requirements alone.'93
117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003).
..5 Robert J. Scarpello, Note, Statutory Redundancy: Why Congress Should Overhaul the
Endangered Species Act to Exclude Critical Habitat Designation, 30 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L.
REV. 399, 407 (2003).
' Id. at 407 (quoting Interagency Cooperation Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed.
Reg. 870, 870 (Jan. 4, 1978) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402)).
187 Scarpello, supra note 185, at 408. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (2006).
The term "critical habitat" for a threatened or endangered species
means-
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the
species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of
section 1533 of this title, on which are found those physical or
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and
(II) which may require special management considerations or
protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species
at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section 1533
of this title, upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are
essential for the conservation of the species.
Id.
188 Scarpello, supra note 185, at 408.
189 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2006).
"
9
' Id. § 1533(a)(3)(B).
19' Id. § 1532(5)(A)(I).
192 Id. § 1533(b)(2).
" See, e.g. Senatore, Kostyack & Wetzler, supra note 180, at 448 ("While, [sic] the Act's
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In substance, the change consists of two relevant parts. First, the
Secretary of the Interior "shall not designate as critical habitat any lands
... controlled by the Department of Defense... that are subject to an
integrated natural resources management plan ["INRMP"] ... if the
Secretary determines in writing that such plan provides a benefit to the
species for which critical habitat is proposed. ... "9 Second, "the impact
on national security" was added to "economic impact" and "other relevant
impact" as a balancing factor for consideration when the Secretary of the
Interior determines whether or not "the benefits of... exclusion outweigh
the benefits of specifying [an] area as ... critical habitat .... " 95
It is important to note that this change, while amending the
statute, did not appear to signal a shift in the quantum of substantive
requirements placed on the military by the FWS in recent years. Even
before the passage of these amendments, the FWS had considered "areas
not in need of special management considerations . . . outside the
definition of critical habitat."9 6 This had "included lands covered by
Department of Defense [INRMP] . . . ."" The FWS found that this policy
was "consistent with ... [a] cooperative approach to conservation ....
prohibition on the 'take' of any listed species does theoretically provide protection for
species' habitat, the critical habitat provisions of ESA far and away provide the most
concrete mandate ... for federal agencies to advance the Act's recovery goal through
habitat protection.") (citation omitted). But see Scarpello, supra note 186, at 431 (calling
the "critical habitat designation .... a superfluous requirement that serves merely to
appease environmentalists who desire another weapon against land development"). For
a more complete discussion of the debate surrounding this issue, see infra Part III.B.
14 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, §
318(a), 117 Stat. 1391, 1433 (2003).
195 Id. § 318(b); 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
... Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, Regarding the Designation of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered
Species Act (Apr. 10, 2003), available at httpJ/www.fws.gov/lawsfTESTIMONY/108th/20031
Manson2003aprillO.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). Before 2003, the FWS had determined
"adequate special management" based on three considerations:
(1) A current plan/agreement must be complete and provide sufficient
conservation benefit to the species;
(2) the plan must provide assurances that the conservation manageinent
strategies will be implemented; and
(3) the plan must provide assurances that the conservation management
strategies will be effective, i.e., provide for periodic monitoring and rev-
isions as necessary. If all of these criteria are met, then the lands covered
under the plan would no longer meet the definition of critical habitat.
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Designation of Critical Habitat
for the Mexican Spotted Owl, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,530, 8,543 (Feb. 1, 2001).
197 Manson, supra note 196.
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critical to maintaining our Nation's biodiversity."198 Similarly, the Army
viewed the change in critical habitat procedures as an "additional tool for
the military and FWS,"199 acknowledging the previous FWS policy and its
belief that the new provisions would actually make "coordination" with
FWS even more critical.2 °0 Stated simply, it appeared that neither the
Army nor the FWS believed that the new critical habitat designation
procedures denoted a relaxation in the substantive requirements placed
on the Army to comply with the ESA.2°'
The prior FWS practice may have seemed to make the new legisl-
ation unnecessary, as military readiness was already receiving deference
in the designation process without a statutory provision.20 2 Two tensions
were at work, both of which appeared significant enough for Congress and
the Administration to take action.
First, the FWS policy of excluding from critical habitat designa-
tion those areas under plans, such as an INRMP, that addressed "special
management considerations" had recently been strongly rejected by the
Federal District Court.20 3 In Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, °4
the plaintiffs challenged the FWS's exclusion of almost nine million
acres from the Mexican Spotted Owl's critical habitat in the Southwest
United States. 2 5 The Owl was listed as "threatened" in 1993, with the
FWS initially finding that it was "prudent to designate critical habitat
for the owl, but that such habitat was not determinable."2 6 A series of
litigation began in 1994 to "compel FWS to designate critical habit,"
20 7
with a final rule being published a year and a half later. This designation
of critical habitat, however, was revoked in 1998, and another lawsuit was
filed which again resulted in the court ordering FWS to designate critical
habitat for the owl. A Proposed Rule was finally published in July of
2000.208 While over thirteen million acres were initially included,2 9 in
198 Id.
'99 Mark Mahoney, Commentary, ESA Amendments Change Process for Critical Habitat
Designation at DoD Installations, ENvTL. UPDATE, Spring 2004, available at http://aec.
army.mil/usaec/publicaffairsupdate/spr4/sprO4O9.html.
200 Id.
201 Some Army environmental litigators believed that, instead of being an "exemption,"
this was a "substitution of a like-kind process." Telephone Interview with Colonel
Charles L. Green, supra note 123.
.2 See Manson, supra note 196.
" Id. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F.Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Ariz. 2003).
204 240 F.Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Ariz. 2003).205 Id. at 1091.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1092.
208 Id. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Designation of
20061
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POLY REV.
considering the adequacy of tribal management plans 210 and "Forest
Plans" generated by the U.S. Forest Service,21 the FWS only actually
designated about 4.9 million acres in Arizona and 4.6 million acres in
New Mexico in the Final Rule.1
The court rejected this process, finding the language of the ESA
clear: "[wihat is determinative is whether or not the habitat is 'essential
to the conservation of the species' and special management of that habitat
is possibly necessary. 213 The FWS could not rely on the existence of other
management plans to affect their decision to designate critical habitat, as
this practice, which "limit[ed] the number of allowable protections to a
listed species' habitat is not only unsupported by the English language,
but runs contrary to one of the enunciated policies of the ESA."
214
The FWS, which had been struggling for years to keep pace with
the "relentless cycle of litigation over its implementation [of the critical
habitat provisions] of the ESA,"215 was now faced with the potential for
even more costly and time-consuming litigation stemming from the
rejection of its "special management considerations [and] protections"
policy.216 As a result,"codifying the policy on excluding military lands
from critical habitat"21 was important to preserving efficiency in what
some described as a "broken" system which was already "provid[ing]
little real conservation benefit [while] consum[ing] enormous agency
resources and impos[ing] huge social and economic costs."1 '
The second tension at work was coming from the political arena,
with policy makers concerned that the effects of encroachment on military
installations were beginning to significantly impact "the kind of military
Critical Habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,336 (July 21, 2000).
209 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 240 F.Supp. 2d at 1092 (citing Proposed Designation of
Critical Habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl, 65 Fed. Reg. at 45,336.).210 Id. at 1093-94.
211 Id. at 1096.
212 Id. at 1093.
213 Id. at 1099 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(a)(I)).
214 Id. at 1099-1100.
215 Manson, supra note 196.
216 Id.
217 id.
2 1 Id. In addition to Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, the FWS and the military
had a more direct cause for concern; the Natural Resources Defense Counsel had recently
filed a direct challenge to the FWS's reliance on a military INRMP in excluding parts of
Miramar Marine Corps Air Base in California from critical habitat designation.
REPUBLICAN POL'YCOMM., supra note 169, at 4-6. See generally Sandra I. Irwin, Pentagon
Lobbies for Environmental Legal Relief- Environmental Managers Told to be More
Attuned to Military Training Needs, NATL DEFENSE MAG., Apr. 2003, available at
http'//www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2003/apr/PentagonLobbies.htm.
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training that is critical to assuring combat readiness, winning wars, and
protecting lives."219 Senate Republicans cited to several examples,
identified by senior military officials, of the harmful effects encroachment
was having on military training and operations around the globe.220 The
Republican Policy Committee described the encroachment problem as
"growing," partly due to the modem military's greater requirements and
"in part because of urban sprawl."22' The Committee also cited General
John Keane, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, who emphasized that "[tihe first
time soldiers conduct a realistic operation cannot, cannot, be during a time
of war. We must train as we intend to fight. And it is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to do so under such environmental restrictions."222 The RRPI
addressed these concerns by giving the military the flexibility it wanted.223
A brief look at the critical habitat process on Army installations
substantially validates the concerns of military officials. By 2002, the
FWS had designated critical habitat on twelve Army bases.224 Fort
Lewis, Washington, was one of the most restricted, with "[seventy]
percent of the training land ... designated as critical habitat for the
threatened Northern Spotted Owl," 225 even though no Northern Spotted
Owls occupied the installation. 226 Fort Irwin, California, home of the
Army's National Training Center ("NTC"), was also significantly affected,
with 22,000 acres of the base already restricted from certain military
uses as critical habitat for the Desert Tortoise. 2 7 Further, the Desert
Tortoise at Fort Irwin proved to be an issue that would not soon be
resolved, as a series of Army "Land Use Requirements Studies" indicated
that the NTC required an increase in maneuver area of about seventy
percent to meet its current and projected requirements.22 s
219 REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., supra note 168, at 1.
220 See id. at 1-5. These included the issues with the RCW at Fort Bragg, various ESA
compliance concerns for the Marine Corps in California at Miramar Marine Corps Air
Station and Camp Pendleton, and training limitations to protect sea turtles at Vieques
range in Puerto Rico. Id. at 3-5.
221 Id. at 3.
222 Id. at 2 (quoting General Keane's testimony before the Senate Armed Services'
Readiness Subcommittee (Mar. 13, 2003)).223 Id. at 6-8.
224 Statement of General Keane, 2002, supra note 176.
225 id.
226 Id. ("Six of the 12 installations, including Fort Lewis, are as yet unoccupied by the
species for which critical habitat is designated.").
227 id.
228 Fort Irwin Expansion, Background Information: Determine Acreage Requirements,
http://www.fortirwinlandexpansion.com/Background.htm#LURS (last visited Dec. 1,
2006). The latest of three studies, conducted in 2002, found that the NTC needed to
expand its operating area from 350,304 to 593,041 acres. Id. The Army explained this
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The two tensions influencing the military's critical habitat
designation process, one from the courts and the other from political and
environmental realities, provided the impetus for legislative change.
Both the Army and FWS had reason to be relieved, and were able to
continue their established procedure with explicit statutory authority
after the amendment. However, the prospect of a new military exemp-
tion from the ESA sparked debate about the proper balance between
national security and environmental protection.
B. Arguments Surrounding the Application of the SECDEF's
"National Security" Exemption and the Critical
Habitat Exemption
The prospect of new military exemptions from substantive environ-
mental laws drew comment from many camps. The polarizing nature of
this issue is not new, and unsurprisingly, the discussion of critical habitat
among commentators was both passionate and widely divergent. This
subpart provides an overview of the debate surrounding the critical
habitat designation process and the RRPI, focusing on the new military
critical habitat provisions and their interrelationship with the broader
national security exemption.
The opinions represented in legal scholarship have been largely
critical of changes to the critical habitat procedures. This criticism was
at least partially the result of disagreement about the practical effects
of critical habitat designation. Some environmental groups believed that
the Bush Administration placed very little value on the critical habitat
designation process in general.229 This criticism was validated to some
degree by the litigation problems that the FWS faced, with the costs of
the process itself swallowing the benefits secured for endangered and
need thusly:
The expansion of the NTC at Fort Irwin is essential to maintaining
operational readiness for national security .... When Fort Irwin was
designated the NTC in 1980, tactics were structured around equipment
that could effectively engage an enemy at ranges of 1 to 12 miles.
Today, the Army effectively engages the enemy at ranges up to 60
miles away. Also, the pace of tactical operations has increased from 10
miles per hour to more than 25 miles per hour.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PROPOSED EXPANSION FOR FORT IRWIN AND THE NATIONAL TRAINING
CENTER 4 (2001), available at http://www.fortirwinlandexpansion.com/PDFs/NTC%
20Prop%2OExp%20Plan.pdf.
22 See Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, H.R. 1588-Defense Authorization Bill: In
Extreme Overreach, Guts Key Provisions of ESA and MMPA (May 19,2003), http://www.
defenders.org/releases/pr2003/pr051903c.html.
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threatened species. 2 " However, many environmental practitioners
asserted the opposite position, with the broader opinion being that the
critical habitat was integral to achieving proper species protection.23'
The inefficiency and inconsistency of the designation process was
therefore a sign that FWS had not been adequately performing their
duty to protect habitat.232 Any change in policy should therefore be to
broaden the application of critical habitat designation.233
In contrast to the concerns about critical habitat protections in gen-
eral, other commentators were skeptical about any potential change in
habitat designation because of the implications for military environmental
compliance. Former FWS Director Jamie Clark viewed RRPI as "unjustified
because DOD's longstanding approach of working through compliance
issues on an installation-by-installation basis works."234 The most vocal
2
. Scarpello, supra note 185, at 416-30. "In order to stop and defend these lawsuits-and
then to compel compliance via the inevitable injunctions-the FWS will have to cutback
[sic] on its other duties, including listing endangered and threatened species ....
Therefore, Congress should eliminate the critical habitat designation requirement post
haste." Id. at 430.
231 See Thomas F. Darin, Comment, Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered
Species Act: Habitat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209,
235 (2000) ("[T~he most significant provision in the ESA to protect habitat [is] the
requirement that the Department of Interior through FWS designate critical habitat
concurrently with a species' listing ... ."). Mr. Darin is a practitioner in Missoula, MT
who works with the National Wildlife Federation. Id. at 209.
2 2 I d. at 235.
233 Senatore, Kostyack & Wetzler, supra note 179. "[T]he critical habitat provisions of
ESA far and away provide the most concrete mandate in the ESA for federal agencies to
advance the Act's recovery goal through habitat protection." Id. at 448. The authors are
practitioners with the Defenders of Wildlife, the National Wildlife Federation, and the
National Resources Defense Counsel, respectively. Id. at 447. See also Amy Armstrong,
Critical Habitat Designations Under the Endangered Species Act: Giving Meaning to the
Requirements for Habitat Protection, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 53 (2002). "Rather than
weakening the ESA through a more general description of critical habitat, the FWS can
use the broad habitat descriptions to issue 'survival habitat' concurrently with the listing
of a species." Id. at 86. This would provide listed species with the "benefit from
immediate protection of critical habitat... provid[ing] some protections beyond mere
listing and waiting up to three years (or indefinitely in some cases) for critical habitat
determinations to be made." Id. at 83.
234 Impact of Military Training on the Environment: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Jamie Clark, Senior
Vice President for Conservation Programs, National Wildlife Federation), available at
http://epw.senate.gov/hearing-statements.cfm?&id=213704. Specific to the ESA, Clark
testified that
[t]he Defense Department's proposed ESA exemption suffers from
three basic flaws: it would severely weaken this nation's efforts to
conserve imperiled species and the ecosystems on which all of us
depend; it is unnecessary for maintaining military readiness; and it
ignores the Defense Department's own record of success in balancing
2006] 285
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
criticism again came from the environmental community, which argued
that the critical habitat amendments "[glive the DOD a [flree-[p]ass to
[i]gnore [habitat [p]rotection."235 An additional concern was the military's
perceived immunity from lawsuits brought by citizen groups to enforce the
ESA;236 that "[tihe fear of terrorist attack... will serve only to quicken this
trend [to sacrifice endangered species in the name of national security] and
one day ultimately leave the citizen suit provision of the ESA powerless to
stop military action that threatens endangered species."" 7 Not surprisingly,
there was also criticism of past FWS practices in excluding military lands
from critical habitat designation.238
In contrast, broad support also existed for the RRPI provisions
from those both in and out of uniform. One argument proponents made
was that the military-readiness-versus-environmental-protection calculus
weighed in favor of the military, observing that "as increasing numbers of
men and women die each day while serving the United States in Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom, it seems appropriate that Congress does everything
in its power to help them train and effectively execute their mission."239
Outside of academia, some simply saw the RRPI as providing long-needed
relief for the military to train effectively for combat.24 °
The most important call for a decrease in training restrictions
came from the military itself, asserting the need to "train as we intend to
fight," and noting that it was "becoming increasingly difficult to do so
readiness and conservation objectives under existing law.
Id.
235 Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 229. See, e.g., Amanda Griscom,
Polluting the Village to Save It: Bush Administration Cites "National Security" as Reason
to Skirt Enviro Rules, GRIST, Aug. 12,2004, available at http://www.grist.org/news/muck/
2004/08/12/griscom-defense; ENVIRONMENT 2004, PUrING POLLUTERS FIRST: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S ENVIRONMENTAL REcORD 55-57 (2004), available at http://www.
environment2004.org/files/Env2004_BushRPT.pdf.
236 Palatucci, supra note 138, at 588. Palatucci points prominently to two examples:
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410
(9th Cir. 1990) (inferring that a citizen suit challenging a military activity that does not
threaten to drive an endangered species into extinction will fail), and Water Keeper
Alliance v. United States Dep't of Def., 271 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that Water
Keeper failed to make the requisite showing of irreparable harm needed to enjoin
military activities). Id. at 593-98.
237 Id. at 597-98.
238 See NAT'L WILDLIFE FEDERATION, FACTSHEET: FWS HAS REPEATEDLY GRANTED DOD's
REQUESTS THAT ITS LANDS BE EXCLUDED FROM ESA CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS
(2003), available at http://epw.senate.gov/108th/FWSDOD-requests.doc.
239 Truban, supra note 9, at 171.
240 See generally Harold Kennedy, Military Training Gets Break from Environmental
Rules, NAT'L DEFENSE MAG., Aug. 2003, available at httpJ/www.nationaldefensemagazine
.org/issues/2003/Aug/MilitaryTraining.htm.
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under such environmental restrictions."" Additionally, in 2003, three Air
Force Judge Advocates ("JAGs") suggested that the existing exemptions
in substantive environmental statutes were inadequate to preserve
military readiness,242 correctly observing that the existing exemptions,
including the SECDEF's exemption to the ESA, are limited to individual
cases where repeated use would inflict "death by a thousand cuts."2" The
need was for exemptions to address "training and operations... [as] on-
going [sic] needs-not an emergency or an exception."2"
While some observers approached the issue from these discrete
perspectives, Professor Stephen Dycus of the Vermont Law School
attempted to reconcile the military's environmental policy with ESA
compliance and modern training needs.245 Professor Dycus acknowledged
both the sincerity of military leaders as well as the need for occasional
"[einvironmental compromises.., in the interest of national security."246
His concern was that the RRPI was passed with neither "a thorough
analysis of the interests at stake, [nor] a robust public discussion."24 He
also saw the critical habitat amendment as providing little additional
benefit to the military because of the already-available national security
exemption.248 In addition to Professor Dycus, the larger environmental
community seems to argue that further amendments should not be
granted since the existing SECDEF exemption remains unused.249
The competing concerns of military readiness and environmental
compliance clearly elicit strong opinion and engender debate. The stakes,
however, are not what they may appear, as the passage of the critical
habitat exemption does not necessarily denote that one of these concerns
must suffer wholesale for the other.
241 REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., supra note 168, at 2 (quoting General Keane's testimony
before the Senate Armed Services' Readiness Subcommittee (Mar. 13, 2003)).
22 Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 65-67, 87-88.
Id. at 87.2 4 4id.
245 See Dycus, Environmental Baby, Terrorist Bath Water, supra note 142; Dycus, Osama's
Submarine, supra note 9.
24 Dycus, Osama's Submarine, supra note 9, at 53.
247 Id. at 54.
248 Dycus, Environmental Baby, Terrorist Bath Water, supra note 142.
249 See, e.g., Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 229 ("The ESA already has
tremendous flexibility, and the agencies regularly work with the DOD to exclude lands
from critical habitat designation on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the ESA includes a
national security exemption that has never been utilized by the DOD.").
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C. Reconciling the History of the ESA and the Evolution of Mili-
tary Policy: The Critical Habitat Exemption as an Appropriate
and Necessary Compromise
In the preceding discussion, three issues were identified that in
many ways converge with the consideration of the new critical habitat
exemption. The first is the evolution of Army environmental policy,
especially concerning how it has dealt with the tensions between environ-
mental regulatory compliance and training needs."' The second is the
functional scope of the SECDEF's existing ESA exemption, which has
remained unused throughout the recent evolution of the Army's environ-
mental policy.251 The third is the proposal and passage of the critical
habitat amendments themselves. 252 At the convergence of these issues,
two important observations become evident.
First, although critics point to the broad scope of the SECDEF's
exemption while arguing against changes such as the RRPI, 5 3 they do
not acknowledge the potential environmental impacts that this type of
confrontational approach could have. The course of Army policy has been
to bring their activities within the requirements of the ESA where
exemptions may in fact be reasonable. With competing definitions of
"national security" making this statutory term anything but clear,25 4 the
Army's restrictive definition255 may actually result in the most circum-
scribed applicability of the exemption power. Using the existing exemp-
tion as an excuse to avoid additional exemptions or amendments may
force the Department of Defense to couch any encroachment-related
problem as a "national security" concern when their training needs are
jeopardized.256 In the end, Army policy could shift from viewing the
SECDEF's exemption as an "extraordinary remedy, to be invoked as a
measure of last resort in wartime,"2 7 to one which is relied on as a matter
250 See supra Part I.
251 See supra Part II.
252 See supra Part III.
25 See Dycus, Environmental Baby, Terrorist Bathwater, supra note 142; see also
Palatucci, supra note 138, at 587-93.
'2' See supra Part II.A.
255 See Diner, supra note 46, at 196 n.225.
256 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
257 Diner, supra note 46, at 196 (citing an interview with Major Craig Teller of the U.S.
Army Environmental Law Division in 1993). See Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note
7 at 87-88. "The Defense Department believes that it is unacceptable as a matter of
public policy for indispensable readiness activities to be unlawful under our environ-
mental laws absent repeated invocation of emergency authority." Id. (quoting the
testimony of Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense Mayberry and DuBois before the
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of course to meet training and operational requirements. Those opposed
to new exemptions would surely not view a liberal application of the
national security exemption as good for wildlife.
Second, the new critical habitat "exemptions" do not appear to be
new at all, but merely the codification of an existing FWS and DoD
practice.258 While military environmental practices may be subject to
criticism by some,259 the success the Army has had with the RCW 26 ° and
its new focus on repeating this at other installations 261' are signs that the
Army is not intent on running roughshod over the ESA. Further, the
success at Fort Bragg shows that habitat protection on military land can
occur without a critical habitat designation by FWS.262 After Center for
Biological Diversity v. Norton,263 the new critical habitat amendment is
important to ensuring that the Army has a useful tool at its disposal for
balancing its training needs with environmental protection.
These observations afford a backdrop for viewing the prudence of
the critical habitat amendments. Ultimately, this presents the question
of whether military and environmental interests are always in direct
conflict. Both sides can probably agree that the "national security"
exemption 26' is best left as a "measure of last resort,"265 left unused in all
but the most dire of circumstances. A requirement for broader use would
hurt the military by demanding investment of substantial time and
resources in each request. 266 Environmentalists could also find the door
opened for almost unchecked exemption authority267 which would include
not only critical habitat designation, but all substantive requirements of
the ESA itself.
268
CONCLUSION
It may seem almost automatic for military policy makers and
environmentalists to find themselves pitted against one another in
House Armed Services Committee on Range Encroachment (May 16, 2002)).
258 Manson, supra note 196.
259 See, e.g., Palatucci, supra note 138.
260 See supra Part II.D.
261 See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 180.
262 Dycus, Osama's Submarine, supra note 9, at 25 & n.118.
26' 240 F.Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Ariz. 2003).
264 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2006).
265 Diner, supra note 46, at 196 (citing an interview with Major Craig Teller of the U.S.
Army Environmental Law Division (1993)).216 See Willard, Zimmerman & Bee, supra note 7, at 87-88.
26 See supra Part II.B.
268 See supra Part III.A.
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competition to secure their interests, be it national security or environ-
mental protection. While the broad implications of possible new exemp-
tions to environmental statues are outside the scope of this discussion,
the evolution of Army environmental policy and the ESA exemption
process clearly demonstrate that military and environmental interests
are not always mutually exclusive. The choice to keep the national
security exemption unused is best for both sides, but doing so requires
compromise. At first glance, the critical habitat amendment may seem
to be a one-sided success for the military; however, viewed in light of the
national security exemption and Army policy, it emerges as an appropri-
ate and timely balance of important national interests.
